Please note: the training ticket does not include access to the conference. Similarly, the conference ticket does not grant access to the trainings. If you have any questions, reach out to us.
In the ~15 years since the launch of the Osmocom and OpenBTS projects (2008), "Fuzzing the Phone in your Phone" (2009), and "All Your Basebands Are Belong To Us" (2010), hackers, vendors, academia, and also offensive security companies and their LEA clients have been turning increasing attention to the baseband as a binary exploitation attack vector.
In that time, scores of quality presentations have been published (some, we offer with false modesty, by yours truly), vendors and standardization bodies raised the security bar in meaningful ways, and the perception shifted from baseband research being met perhaps with "woah, sick!" to being called "not that difficult".
But also during this time, the gap between the challenges addressed by research demonstrations and operational use has started growing. Alas, the difficulties in going from the former to the later will be the focus of our training.
In this course, students will learn through hands-on exercises how to setup and operate rogue cellular networks with various radio access technologies, using open source components and software-defined radios, how to use them for mobile intercept attacks, how to make modifications for generating malicious traffic via programming interfaces, and how to open up devices for static and dynamic baseband firmware analysis.
The training will include multitudes of case studies on the attack surfaces, vulnerabilities, and hardening measures of various mainstream baseband implementations and challenge students with hands-on exercises for identifying and realizing baseband vulnerabilities.
All throughout, the material will cover approaches, techniques, and tools for addressing the various challenges associated with developing and maintaining baseband vulnerability chains for operational use.
Our training is built on content that is original (includes vulnerabilities of ours that vendors have fixed from our disclosures but we have not yet described publicly), fresh (uses baseband and network component variants and vulnerabilities from 2022 and 2023), and diverse (considers the implementations of Samsung, Mediatek, and Huawei).
Day 1: Running Rogue Networks
Day 2: RCE Bug Hunting
Day 3: Full Chain Exploitation
Product Security Engineers
Security Researchers
MUST
Workstation that has:
IDEAL
MUST
IDEAL
documentation: theory slides, lab exercise manuals
training kit: smartphone and SDR devices needed for the exercises
For congestion management and optimal learning experience, exercises using SDRs and phones will be carried out in pairs.
Daniel Komaromy (@kutyacica): Daniel has worked in the mobile security field his entire career, going on 15+ years of vulnerability research experience playing both defense and offense. At Qualcomm, he hunted baseband 0-days, authored exploit mitigations, trained developers, and fought the SDLC machine. Later, he worked as a security consultant in the automotive security industry, followed by years of playing offense at Pwn2Own, CTFs around the world, and also for real. He has disclosed scores of critical vulnerabilities in leading mobile vendors’ products and presented his research at industry leading conferences (like Black Hat, REcon, and Ekoparty). Today he is the founder and director of security research at TASZK Security Labs, a vulnerability research oriented security consultancy outfit, and he still follows the motto: there's no crying in baseband!