Talk Title:

Exploring Dual Edges of SRAM Data Remanence in SoCs: Covert Storage and Exfiltration Risks in TEE

Abstract:

SRAM can be engineered to retain its data well beyond the disconnection of power, exhibiting a persistent memory effect. This capability enables the permanent storage of data, a phenomenon known as long-term data remanence. This article explores the dual aspects of SRAM long-term data remanence in contemporary system-on-chips, highlighting both opportunities and risks. We demonstrate a method to covertly store information in the hardware layer of SRAM, achieving plausible deniability.

Additionally, the article reveals how an SoC can be manipulated into a state where it begins to absorb on-chip data into the cache's analog layer. This process poses risks, particularly for the exfiltration of sensitive information from Trusted Execution Environments such as ARM TrustZone.

Speaker Bio:

Jubayer Mahmod recently earned his PhD in Computer Engineering from Virginia Tech, where he was mentored by Dr. Matthew Hicks. His research, specializing in hardware-oriented system security, cloud FPGA security, and embedded system security, emphasized identifying vulnerabilities and developing robust defenses. He has published his findings at prominent systems and security conferences, including ASPLOS and IEEE S&P. Currently, Jubayer is a key member of the offensive security team at Lucid Motors.