



# riscure

driving your security forward


**FLIPPIN' FAKE FLOPS FOR  
FUN, FAME AND FORTUNE**

**JASPER VAN WOUDENBERG**  
**@JZVW**

# A TALE OF FAULT INJECTORS



Hardware Hacking Handbook



FCC ID: 2ABCB-RP13BP  
IC: 20953-RP13P

CE



ELPIDA  
981328P  
1821080


pp49  
pp45  
pp44

pp48  
pp47  
pp46

171227E  
0.50 CMV








# HOW DOES A CHIP WORK?





Chris Tarnovsky,  
Hardware Hacking Handbook

Metal 3

Metal 2

Metal 1

Poly


Metal 3


Metal 2


Metal 1


Polysilicon

Substrate









# SIMULATING FAULTS


```
byte x, A1, A2, _01_, _02_, _03_;
```

```
_01_ = ~A1;
```

```
_02_ = ~A2;
```


```
_03_ = _01_ | _02_;
```

```
x = _03_;
```






```
byte x, A1, A2, _01_, _02_, _03_;  
_01_ = ~A1 & 1;  
_02_ = ~A2 & 1;  
_03_ = _01_ | _02_ & 1;  
x = _03_ & 1;
```



glitch\_in  
[4:0]






```

byte x, A1, A2, _01_, _02_, _03_;
_01_ = ~A1;
_02_ = ~A2;
_03_ = _01_ | _02_;
x = _03_;

```




# DEMO PICORV32

```
1 void secureboot(void) {
2     set_test_status(TEST_START);
3     debug("branch test\n");
4
5     set_test_status(TEST_TRIGGER_UP);
6     char success = *(volatile unsigned char *) (UART0_BASE_ADDR);
7     if(success) {
8         set_test_status(TEST_TRIGGER_DOWN);
9         debug("success\n");
10        set_test_status(TEST_FI_SUCCESS);
11    } else {
12        set_test_status(TEST_TRIGGER_DOWN);
13        debug("failure\n");
14        set_test_status(TEST_FI_FAIL);
15    }
16 }
```

```
[*] Jobs total: 995329, No fault: 949921, Exploitable: 514, Unexploitable: 44894, Unknown fault: 0, Jobs/s: 16579.852769266963, Fin
[*] Jobs total: 1435392, No fault: 1376828, Exploitable: 519, Unexploitable: 58045, Unknown fault: 0, Jobs/s: 17316.184422914328, F
[*] finished. Time: 85.72568535804749
/nlsim/tools/fi_grep.py -v -n 10 -g /nlsim/output/picorv32/ffonly/instrumented.v.map -r /nlsim/output/picorv32/ffonly/repro -o /nls
ffonly/figrep_bruteforce.res | tee /nlsim/output/picorv32/ffonly/repro.repro.log
[*] Loading glitchmap
Version: 3, date: 2021-10-28 04:23:55.017460, machines: 256, numpints: 1596, glitchstart: 0, glitchend: 800, glitchwidth: 1, clocks
[*] Converting to numpy arrays
Data points: 519
Start: 423, num: 98/18%, pins: _14823_( _00152_->pcpi_rs1,None)@209, _15465_( _00752_->mem_la_wdata,None)@851, _15486_( _00773_->pcpi_r
_( _00775_->pcpi_rs2,None)@874, _15489_( _00776_->pcpi_rs2,None)@875, _15490_( _00777_->pcpi_rs2,None)@876, _15491_( _00778_->pcpi_rs2,N
_0780_->pcpi_rs2,None)@879
Start: 424, num: 67/12%, pins: _14823_( _00152_->pcpi_rs1,None)@209, _15467_( _00754_->mem_la_wdata,None)@853, _15465_( _00752_->mem_la
5492_( _00779_->pcpi_rs2,None)@878, _15493_( _00780_->pcpi_rs2,None)@879, _15494_( _00781_->pcpi_rs2,None)@880, _15495_( _00782_->pcpi_r
_( _00848_->pcpi_rs1,None)@947
Start: 422, num: 60/11%, pins: _15687_( _00974_->\cpuregs[15][31],None)@1073, _15000_( _00017_->\decoded_imm_j[15],None)@386, _16177_(
_imm[5],None)@26, _16175_( _01462_->instr_blt,None)@1561, _15670_( _00957_->\cpuregs[15][14],None)@1056, _15669_( _00956_->\cpuregs[15
)@382, _15668_( _00955_->\cpuregs[15][12],None)@1054, _15667_( _00954_->\cpuregs[15][11],None)@1053
Start: 421, num: 48/9%, pins: _15662_( _00949_->\cpuregs[15][6],None)@1048, _14702_( \alu_out[16]->\alu_out_q[16],None)@88, _14696_( \a
->\alu_out_q[11],None)@83, _14698_( \alu_out[12]->\alu_out_q[12],None)@84, _14699_( \alu_out[13]->\alu_out_q[13],None)@85, _14700_( \a
>\alu_out_q[15],None)@87, _14703_( \alu_out[17]->\alu_out_q[17],None)@89, _14694_( \alu_out[8]->\alu_out_q[8],None)@80
Start: 418, num: 29/5%, pins: _16140_( _01427_->\reg_next_pc[2],None)@1526, _16180_( _01467_->instr_slti,None)@1566, _15660_( _00947_->
None)@43, _14656_( _07186_->\reg_out[6],None)@42, _14655_( _07185_->\reg_out[5],None)@41, _16183_( _01470_->instr_ori,None)@1569, _1618
_sltiu,None)@1567, _14654_( _07184_->\reg_out[4],None)@40
Start: 419, num: 16/3%, pins: _14718_( _00001_->is_lui_auipc_jal,None)@104, _14807_( _00136_->pcpi_rs1,None)@193, _14685_( _00000_->dec
1568, _16183_( _01470_->instr_ori,None)@1569, _16184_( _01471_->instr_andi,None)@1570, _14730_( _00011_->\cpu_state[4],None)@116, _1618
s1,None)@190, _16193_( _01480_->instr_or,None)@1579
```

```
VM000 has 1 glitches at clock 67 for 1 cycles on pins 1531
prerun | machines: 1 start: 0 end: 67
VM000 pc: 00000000
VM000 pc: 00000044
Allocating 0x10000000 bytes of memory for block 0x2. Addr = 0x002ffffc
VM000: trigger for test status to 80 is set
VM000: setting test status to 80
VM000 pc: 00000020
glitch | machines: 1 start: 67, clocks: 800 end_check: -1
VM000: Inserting glitches at cycle 67
VM000 pc: 00000024 (at fault)
VM000 pc: 000000a8
VM000: trigger for test status to 83 is set
VM000: setting test status to 83
VM000 pc: 00000020
VM000 pc: 00000030
VM000 pc: 00000030
VM000 pc: 00000030
VM000 pc: 00000030
VM000 pc: 00000030
VM000 pc: 00000030
VM000 pc: 00000030
VM000 pc: 00000030
VM000 console: success
VM000 pc: 000000c4
VM000: trigger for test status to 40 is set
VM000: setting test status to 40
VM000 Handle tick done, test done from sw; newstatus 40
Test done at cycle 352
VM000: trigger for test status to 40 is set
VM000: setting test status to 40
VM000 Handle tick done, test done from sw; newstatus 40
Test done at cycle 352
```

top 100 number of possible faults per start time




```
UM255: Handle tick, status 82
clock 123
UM255: Handle tick, status 82
UM255 pc: 00000088
```

```
char success = *(volatile unsigned char *) (UART0_BASE_ADDRESS + UART0_RX_DATA);
7c: a00007b7          lui    a5,0xa0000
80: 0087c783          lbu   a5,8(a5) # a0000008 <secureboot+0x9fffffc4>
84: 0ff7f793          andi  a5,a5,255
    if(success) {
88: 02078e63          beqz  a5,c4 <secureboot+0x80>
```

```
1 void secureboot(void) {
2     set_test_status(TEST_START);
3     debug("branch test\n");
4
5     set_test_status(TEST_TRIGGER_UP);
6     char success = *(volatile unsigned char *) (UART0_BASE_ADDRESS + UART0_RX);
7     if(success) {
8         success = *(volatile unsigned char *) (UART0_BASE_ADDRESS + UART0_RX);
9         if(success) {
10            set_test_status(TEST_TRIGGER_DOWN);
11            debug("success\n");
12            set_test_status(TEST_FI_SUCCESS);
13        }
14    } else {
15        set_test_status(TEST_TRIGGER_DOWN);
16        debug("failure\n");
17        set_test_status(TEST_FI_FAIL);
18    }
19 }
```



519 -> 393 faults



# OPENTITAN AES ROUND TRUNCATE

\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.key\_init\_new\_q[2]  
\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.key\_init\_new\_q[3]  
\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.key\_init\_new\_q[4]  
\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.key\_init\_new\_q[5]  
\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.key\_init\_new\_q[6]  
\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.key\_init\_new\_q[7]  
\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.num\_rounds\_q[1]  
\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.num\_rounds\_q[2]  
\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.num\_rounds\_q[3]  
\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.round\_q[0]  
\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.round\_q[1]  
\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.round\_q[2]  
\aes.aes\_core.aes\_control.round\_q[3]  
\aes.aes\_core.key\_init[0]  
\aes.aes\_core.key\_init[100]  
\aes.aes\_core.key\_init[101]  
\aes.aes\_core.key\_init[102]  
\aes.aes\_core.key\_init[103]  
\aes.aes\_core.key\_init[104]  
\aes.aes\_core.key\_init[105]  
\aes.aes\_core.key\_init[106]  
\aes.aes\_core.key\_init[107]  
\aes.aes\_core.key\_init[129]  
\aes.aes\_core.key\_init[130]  
\aes.aes\_core.key\_init[131]

Commits:

B50dc9d7c6148ad94cd77ab24d59da027567f1d2: before  
Fd3708aa4d674ce7ed871e4f41ad7fc7abfa2f69: after  
countermeasure

<https://github.com/lowRISC/opentitan>

```
////////////////////////////////////
// Round Counter Protection //
////////////////////////////////////
// To protect the round counter against fault injection, we use two counters:
// - rnd_ctr_d/q counts the executed rounds. It is initialized to 0 and counts up.
// - rnd_ctr_rem_d/q counts the remaining rounds. It is initialized to num_rounds_q and counts
//   down.
// In addition, we use one parity bit for the rnd_ctr_d/q counter.
//
// An alert is signaled and the FSM goes into the terminal error state if
// i) the sum of the counters doesn't add up, i.e. if rnd_ctr_q + rnd_ctr_rem_q != num_rounds_q, or
// ii) the parity information is incorrect.

// The following primitives are used to place size-only constraints on the
// flops in order to prevent optimizations on the protected round counter.
prim_flop #(
    .Width(4),
    .ResetValue('0)
) u_rnd_ctr_regs (
    .clk_i,
    .rst_ni,
    .d_i ( rnd_ctr_d ),
    .q_o ( rnd_ctr_q )
);
```

```
// Generate parity bits.
assign rnd_ctr_parity_d = ^rnd_ctr_d;
assign rnd_ctr_parity   = ^rnd_ctr_q;

// Detect faults.
assign rnd_ctr_err_sum   = (rnd_ctr_q + rnd_ctr_rem_q != num_rounds_q) ? 1'b1 : 1'b0;
assign rnd_ctr_err_parity = (rnd_ctr_parity != rnd_ctr_parity_q) ? 1'b1 : 1'b0;

assign rnd_ctr_err = rnd_ctr_err_sum | rnd_ctr_err_parity;
```

```
+ // invalid or in case we have detected a fault in the round counter.
+ if (mux_sel_err_i || rnd_ctr_err) begin
+     aes_cipher_ctrl_ns = ERROR;
+ end
```

# RESULT OVERVIEW

	Before	After
Total	27846112	27807584
No fault	27564705	27527206
Round truncate	16	17
Other faults	281391	280361

# FINAL THOUGHTS



- ▷ bin
- ▷ fip
- ▷ include
- ▷ mbedtls
- ▲ src
  - config.c
  - console.c
  - crypto.c
  - firmware.c
  - flash.c
  - gpio.c
  - hash.c
  - main.c
  - mem.c
  - mmc.c
  - otp.c
  - sdmmc.c
  - serial.c
  - string.c
  - timer.c
- build\_fip.py
- generate\_key.py
- Makefile.AArch32

main.c X

```

28
29     if (!is_sec_boot_en) {
30         printf("Enable secure boot\n");
31         sec_boot_enable();
32     }
33     is_sec_boot_enabled(&is_sec_boot_en);
34 }
35
36 if ((uintptr_t)(fip_head = load_fip_from_flash(1)) == -1) {
37     printf("Loading FIP failed\n");
38     __SET_SIM_FAILED();
39 }
40
41 void* fip_base = fip_head->boot_head.base_addr;
42 size_t fip_size = fip_head->boot_head.length - RSA_SIGN_SIZE;
43 void* sign_base = fip_base + fip_size;
44
45 hash_sha1(fip_base, fip_size, fip_hash);
46
47 crypto_rsa_init();
48
49 if(is_sec_boot_en && !crypto_rsa_verify_sha1(fip_hash, sign_base)) {
50     printf("Auth failed\n");
51     __SET_SIM_FAILED();
52 }
53
54 if (unpack_images_from_fip()) {
55     printf("Unpacking FIP failed\n");
56     __SET_SIM_FAILED();
57 }
58
59 pmc_release();
60
61 config_uboot_init(dram_size);
62
63 printf("Boot next stage\n");
64
65 boot_next_stage();
66 }

```


```

8000531C(1/1): MOV r2, #1 -> MOV r2, #3
80005330(1/1): LDR r3, [fp, #-8] -> LDR r3, [fp, #-0]
80005334(1/1): STR r2, [r3, #4] -> ORR r2, r3, r4 (8x)
800052F8(1/1): MOV r0, #0x10 -> MOV r0, #0x10000000 (11x)
8000522C(1/1): LDR r3, [pc, #0x70] -> STR r3, [pc, #0x70]
80005230(1/1): PUSH {fp, lr} -> STMDB pcl, {fp, lr}
8000525C(1/1): LDR r3, [fp, #-8] -> LDR r3, [fp, #-0]
80005264(1/1): STR r0, [r3, #8] -> STR r1, [r3, #8] (3x)
80008580(1/1): MOV r2, #0xac -> ORR r2, r0, #0xac (6x)
8000B6E8(1/1): BNE #0x8000b708 -> BNE #0x8000b748
80008584(1/1): LDR r4, [pc, #0x60] -> LDR r4, [pc, #-0x60]
80008594(1/1): ADD r0, r4, #0x690 -> ADD r0, r4, #0x6b0 (2x)
8000B728(1/1): LDR r3, [pc, #0x94] -> LDR r3, [pc, #0x9c] (9x)
8000B730(1/1): LDRB r3, [r3, #0x73c] -> LDRB r3, [r3], #0x73c (14x)
8000B738(1/1): BEQ #0x8000b76c -> BNE #0x8000b76c (3x)
8000B734(1/1): CMP r3, #0 -> CMP r3, #1 (7x)
80007C0C(1/1): ADD fp, sp, #4 -> STR fp, [sp], r4 (5x)
80008550(1/1): LDR r0, [pc, #0x20] -> LDR r0, [pc, #0x20]! (2x)
80008564(1/1): BL #0x80007c08 -> B #0x80007c08 (5x)
80007C08(1/1): PUSH {fp, lr} -> STMDB pcl, {fp, lr}
80007818(1/1): PUSH {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, sb, sl, fp, lr} -> STMDB pcl, {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, sb, sl, fp, lr} (2x)
8000B72C(1/1): ADD r3, pc, r3 -> ADD r3, pc, fp (5x)
80007C3C(1/1): B #0x80007814 -> B #0x80007804 (2x)
80007C1C(1/1): BEQ #0x80007c30 -> BEQ #0x80007c70
8000B744(1/1): BL #0x80008534 -> BL #0x800084f4 (2x)
80007854(1/1): BL #0x800055e8 -> B #0x800055e8
8000781C(1/1): ADD fp, sp, #0x20 -> ADD sl, sp, #0x20 (7x)
800030A8(1/1): ADD fp, sp, #4 -> STR fp, [sp], r4
80003188(1/1): ADD fp, sp, #4 -> STR fp, [sp], r4
80007898(1/1): BNE #0x800078e4 -> BEQ #0x800078e4 (3x)
800078BC(1/1): MOV r8, r0 -> MOV r8, r8 (12x)
80007904(1/1): MOV r0, r8 -> MOV r0, sb (4x)
80008568(1/1): CLZ r0, r0 -> CMN pc, r0, lsl pc (12x)
8000B748(1/1): CMP r0, #0 -> CMP r8, #0 (11x)
80007908(1/1): SUB sp, fp, #0x20 -> SUB sp, fp, #8
8000856C(1/1): LSR r0, r0, #5 -> LSR r0, r2, #5 (6x)
8000B74C(1/1): BNE #0x8000b76c -> BEQ #0x8000b76c (3x)
80008574(1/1): POP {fp, pc} -> ADCS r8, sp, r0, lsl #16 (3x)

```



<PLUG>



</PLUG>

hardwarehacking.io

# REALLY FINAL THOUGHTS

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A large, stylized graphic of the letter 'R' composed of several overlapping, curved segments in various shades of green and yellow, positioned on the right side of the page.

# riscure

driving your security forward