


# CANANALYZE


A PYTHON FRAMEWORK

HARDWEAR.IO 2020

ERWAN LE-DISEZ & ETIENNE CHARRON / 2020



# ABOUT US



**GROUPE  
RENAULT**



Etienne CHARRON  
Intruder



Erwan LE DISEZ  
Cyber Security specialist


# AGENDA

# CONTEXT

# FRAMEWORK

# DEMO


# NEXT



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
# 01

## CONTEXT



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# ARCHITECTURE OF A CAR




## ■ ECU (Electronic Control Unit)

- BCM (**B**rake **C**ontrol **M**odule)
- Telematics box
- Dashboard
- ....

## ■ BUS

- CAN (**C**ontroller **A**rea **N**etwork)
- I2C (**I**nter-**I**ntegrated **C**ircuit )
- LIN (**L**ocal **I**nterconnect **N**etwork)
- ...





# SECURITY CONCERNS

## ■ Cybersecurity impacts

- Safety (preserve passenger life) [Main concern] ★
- Data privacy (RGPD)
- IT (Automobile knowledge)

## ■ Scenarios


- Compromise an ECU in the multimedia network
- Bypass the CGW to send malicious frames in the vehicule network



```

1011000011011000111101101101100010100000011
0001010000110110001111011011011000101000000
1100001101100011110110110110001010000001100
0110001111011011011000101000000110000110001
000101100011110110110110001010000001100001
01100001101100011110110110001010000001110
0110110001111011011011000101000000110000110
1100011110110110110001010000001100001100011
10001010000110110001111011011011000101000000
110000110110001111011011011000101000000111000
1000101100011110110110110001010000001110000
0011011000111101101101100010100000011000011
01100001101100011110110110110001010000001110
00110100001101100011110110110110001010000001
10000110110001111011011011000101000000110000
1100011110110110110001010000001100001100011
001101100011110110110110001010000001100011
001101100011110110110110001010000001100011
001101100011110110110110001010000001100011

```




# SECURITY CONCERNS



- **Verify Debug services are closed (or correctly locked by a robustness authentication)**
  - UDS services (*Unified Diagnostic Services ISO 14229-1*)
    - ReadMemoryByAddress
    - WriteMemoryByAddress
    - Transfer data
- **Verify sensitives frames are correctly filtered by CGW (CAN firewall)**

*How to verify this ? ... CANalyze ...*

# GLOBAL OVERVIEW



*UDS (ReadMemoryByAddress, WriteMemoryByAddress, DataTransfer)*

**SERVICE\_ID**

**PARAMATER1**

**VERY LONG PARAMATER2**

*Fragmentation*

**FRAG**

**SERVICE\_ID**

**PARAMATER1**

**FRAG**

**VERY LONG PARAMATER2**

**PAD**

*Simple packet (CANid DATA)*

**CANID**

**DLC**

**C**

**FRAG**

**SERVICE\_ID**

**PARAMATER1**



**CRC**





# CAN INTERFACE

## Hardware

"Handmade"



"Daisy-chain" structure with twisted-pair CAN High / CAN Low



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CAN interface	BeagleBone Black + Transceiver	BeagleBone Black + extended CAPE	CANUSB dongle	Komodo CAN DUO	VECTOR
<b>COST</b>	★	★★★	★★★	★★★	★★★★
<b>API</b>	Native Linux socketcan	Native Linux socketcan	Windows Library Native Linux socketcan	Windows/Linux C library + python binding	Windows environ ment / proprietary scripting

CAN connector D-SUB9 / ODB II (termination resistor)




## Software

- Limitation of character device model and drivers implementation
- Linux SocketCAN (>= 2.6.25) based on network layer
- Advanced features and abstraction for user space applications
- SocketCAN user space utilities and tools (can-utils)


# 02

## FRAMEWORK



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
# WHY CREATING A NEW FRAMEWORK?



## Need for a CAN Army Swiss Knife

- Existing internal code base
- Programming language accessible to everyone
- Very simple API to quickly implement tests during security validations
- Support several hardware dongles (KOMODO, CANUSB)
- Support the use of several interfaces at the same time
- Specific features to validate / instrument CAN Gateways (virtual ECU / GW)

# EXISTING FRAMEWORKS



	Udsoncan	CANTools	UDSim	CANalyze
Activity (GIT)	★ ★ ★	★	★ ★	Too recent
Language	Python	Python	C/C++	Python
API simplicity	★ ★	★	★	★ ★ ★
Documentation	★ ★ ★	★ ★ ★	★ ★	★ ★ ★
CAN / ISOTP / UDS	★ ★ ★	★ ★ ★	★ ★ ★	★ ★
ECU Simulator			✓	✓
Script probing (CANid, UDS)		✓	✓	✓
Hardware compatibility	★ ★	★ ★	★ ★	★ ★ ★


# PROVIDED SCRIPTS – VIRTUAL GATEWAY



## Calibration

JSON format defines routing + filtering per interface / CANID

```
"dlc": {
  "ext": {
    "0x20": [ { "payload": "0x0000000000000000",
               "mask": "0xF0F0000000000000" },
              { "payload": "0x0040000000000000",
               "mask": "0xF0F0000000000000" } ],
    "0x21": [ { "payload": "0x0000000000000000",
               "mask": "0xF0F0000000000000" },
              { "payload": "0x0040000000000000",
               "mask": "0xF0F0000000000000" } ] ],
  "v2": {
    "0x20": [ { "payload": "0x0000000000000000",
               "mask": "0xF0F0000000000000" }, ... ] },
  ...
}
```



## Interface mapping

Specific mapping depending on the interfaces

```
"interfaces": {
  "v1": { "channel" : "vcan0",
          "bustype" : "socketcan", "bitrate" : 500000},
  "v2": { "channel" : "vcan3",
          "bustype" : "socketcan", "bitrate" : 500000},
  ...}
```



## Virtual Gateway

Socket CAN Gateway : calibration.json + mapping.json

```
$ python3 scripts/gw_virtual_socketcan.py calibration.json mapping.json
```

```
Add virtual CAN interface vcan3 [physical=v1 virtual=vcan3]
Add virtual CAN interface vcan0 [physical=v2 virtual=vcan0]
Add virtual CAN interface vcan1 [physical=ext virtual=vcan1]
Add virtual CAN interface vcan2 [physical=dlc virtual=vcan2]
```

...

```
R: dlc [0x406 - 0xb'd20a38059b300e']
```

```
R: v1 [0x53f - 0xb'ae2f8f45d9e1']
```

```
R: dlc [0x200 - 0xb'df72']
```

```
R: v1 [0x7aa - 0xb'c5be5f348af39461']
```

```
R: dlc [0x405 - 0xb'67c68e0f3e093806']
```

```
R: v1 [0x7df - 0xb'6f33ee49fb21a96a']
```

```
R: v1 [0x020 - 0xb'12312333']
```

```
  R: CAN ID matches = 0x020
```

```
    F: v1 -> v2 [0x020 - 0xb'12312333']
```

```
W: v2 [0x020 - b'12312333']
```

```
R: v1 [0x021 - 0xb'aaaaaaaa']
```

```
  R: CAN ID matches = 0x021
```

```
    F: v1 -> v2 [0x021 - 0xb'aaaaaaaa']
```

```
W: v2 [0x021 - b'aaaaaaaa']
```

...

READ

FORWARD

WRITE

Send messages to virtual GW:

```
$ cangen vcan0
$ cansend vcan0 123#DEADBEEF
...
```



# PROVIDED SCRIPTS – PHYSICAL GATEWAY




## Calibration

Calibration depending on the hardware

Calibration only required to validate the routing and filtering configuration

## Validation script

- Listen simultaneously on all interfaces and generate traffic depending on the tests
- Discover CANID authorized on interfaces (UDS DiagSessionControl)
- Check authorized CANID and payloads from calibration



## Interface mapping


Specific mapping depending on the interfaces

```
"interfaces": {
  "v1": { "channel" : "vcan1", "bustype" : "socketcan",
          "bitrate" : 500000},
  "ext": { "channel" : "A", "bustype" : "komodo", "port_nr" : 1,
          "bitrate" : 500000},
  "dlc": { "channel" : "B", "bustype" : "komodo", "port_nr" : 0,
          "bitrate" : 500000},
}
```


CANalyze



USB Hub



# PROVIDED SCRIPTS (CANID DISCOVERY)




**Goal:** Discover CANid offering UDS services (needed to get the debug services list)

```
$ python scripts/id_uds.py
km_init_channel: Acquired features: 38
km_init_channel: Bitrate set to 5000000
km_init_channel: Timeout set to 1 second(s)
UDS service detected (canid_send=0x7CA, canid_receive=0x7DA)
```

# PROVIDED SCRIPT (SCAN UDS SERVICES)

**Goal:** list UDS services exposed by the ECU (and verify that some UDS debug services are disabled)




```

$ python scripts/nmap.py
km_init_channel: Acquired features: 38
km_init_channel: Bitrate set to 5000000
km_init_channel: Timeout set to 1 second(s)
Scan.services discovered 10 Diagnostic Session Control
Scan.services discovered 11 ECU Reset
Scan.services discovered 14 Clear Diagnostic Session Information
Scan.services discovered 19 Read DTC Information
Scan.services discovered 22 Read Data By Identifier
Scan.services discovered 27 Security Access
Scan.services discovered 2e Write Data By Identifier
Scan.services discovered 31 Routine Control
Scan.services discovered 3e Tester Present
  
```



# ARCHITECTURE



## ■ CAN abstraction interface

- Strong python-can adherence: message format, socket CAN support (and more)
- Komodo support (single and dual interfaces)

## ■ ISOTP and advanced UDS interfaces

## ■ Context management


- Manage simultaneously multiple interfaces (CAN id filters, timeouts...)
- Per-context cache (with filtering capabilities)

```
ctx = context.create_ctx (channel = 'A',
                          bustype = BusType.KOMODO,
                          port_nr = 0,
                          bitrate = 500000)

vcan.sniff (ctx, max=20)
vcan.write (ctx, can.Message(
            data = [0xD0, 0x32, 0x00, 0x09]), can_id = 0x166)
```

# 03

## DEMO



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# DEMO SETUP




## 4 virtual CAN interfaces:

- vcan0 (MULTIMEDIA) : exposed services
- vcan1 (SAFETY) : sensitive ECU
- vcan2 (ADAS) : optional driving aids
- vcan3 (DIAG) : ODB II diagnostic


## Sample calibration: ALLOW

- SAFETY => \* : ALL CAN ID
- ADAS => MULTIMEDIA : CANID 0x01 / ACK 0x02
- DIAG => SAFETY : CANID 0x0a / ACK 0x0b
- DIAG => ADAS : CANID 0x0d / ACK 0x0e



# 04

## EVOLUTION



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# EVOLUTIONS

## ■ Recent evolutions

- Support CANFD
- Vector hardware support




[https://github.com/renault/canalyze](https://github.com/renault/cananalyze)

## ■ Future evolutions

- Probing UDS routines
- Support more hardware dongle
- Automate some tests on Security Access

■ ...



**THANK YOU**

